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In this  paper I respond to  Kyselo’s  (this collection)  claim that actionism, and
other versions of the enactive embodied approach to mind, fail to accord social re-
lations a constitutive role in making up the human mind. I argue that actionism
can meet this challenge—the view makes relations to others central to an account
of human experience—but I also question whether the challenge is clear enough. I
ask: what exactly does it mean to say that social relations play this sort of con-
stitutive role?
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1 Introduction
In my contribution to this volume (Noë this col-
lection), I seek to bring out the truth in intellec-
tualism. The intellectualist is right, I concede,
that understanding is at work throughout the
domain  of  agency—whereever  we  can  talk  of
perception, or thinking, or action. Understand-
ing is pervasive. The trouble with intellectual-
ism, I argue, is that it cleaves to an unrealistic
conception of what is demanded for understand-
ing to come into play. I particular, it adheres to
an  over-intellectualized  conception  of  under-
standing,  according  to  which  an  action,  or  a
perception,  can  be  conceptual  only  if  it  is
guided, as it were from above, by explicit acts
of judgment. In my target paper I also criticize
anti-intellectualist views, such as that of Drey-
fus,  for  failing  to  break  with  intellectualism;
such views reject the pervasiveness of the under-
standing  because  they  accept  the  intellectual-
ist’s  hyper-intellectualized  conception  of  what
understanding is and because they find it im-
plausible that our experiential or cognitive lives
are intellectual in this way. In this brief reply to
Kyselo’s excellent commentary, I would like to
say something about what the anti-intellectual-
ism of the sort I criticize in the paper gets right.
I now want to try to bring out the insight in
anti-intellectualism.
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2 The truth in anti-intellectualism
If the intellectualist is right that understanding
saturates the space of agency, the anti-intellec-
tualist is right that there is also understanding
beyond the limits of our agency.  Stanley (2011,
cited in Noë this collection) relied on the oppos-
ition between the personal and the subpersonal;
he  supposed  that  what  makes  a  mere  reflex,
which is subpersonal, an action, which is per-
sonal,  is  that  it  is  guided  by  knowledge  or
reason. But the opposition between reflex and
action is not exhaustive, and the crucial dimen-
sion is not that of the contrast between the per-
sonal and the subpersonal.  Consider conversa-
tion, as an example. We can characterize con-
versation as a personal-level action. But there is
a way of describing the phenomenon that defies
such  characterization.  When  two  people  talk
they adopt similar postures, they pause at co-
ordinated intervals, they adjust their volumes to
match  each  other,  they  move  their  eyes  and
modify their dialects, all in ways that are gov-
erned by their interaction (see  Shockley et al.
2009 for a review of this literature). Talking is
what  I  elsewhere  call  an  “organized  activity”
(Noë in press). One remarkable feature of or-
ganized activities, in this sense, is that they are
not guided by the participants or authored by
them. Another is that they are carried on spon-
taneously and without deliberate control. And
yet another is that they are clearly domains in
which highly sophisticated cognitive capacities
—looking,  listening,  paying attention,  moving,
undergoing—are put to work. 
Notice:  I  said above that talking,  in the
sense  I  have  in  mind,  is  not  a  personal-level
activity. What I mean by this is that the sort of
tight coupling and temporal dynamics, the sort
of  organization  we  see  at  work  when  people
talk,  is  not  best  characterized at  the level  of
minutes, hours, choices, etc. that normally char-
acterize  the  personal  level.  But  nor  is  this  a
phenomenon of the subpersonal level. For one
thing,  we aren’t  interested  in  something  hap-
pening in the nervous system of one individual.
We  are  interested  in  something  encompassing
two (or more) people. For another, we aren’t in-
terested in processes unfolding at time-scales of
milliseconds.  No.  We  are interested  in  what
people do, but in a manner that is truly beyond
agency.  We  are  interested,  here,  in  a  phe-
nomenon of  the  embodiment  level (as  distinct
from the subpersonal or the personal level). 
And yet we remain, when thinking about
conversation—or any other organized activity—
very much in a domain where we can and must
speak of cognitive achievement, understanding,
skill, and so on.
One upshot of these considerations, then,
is that while understanding, as I argued above,
is  a  necessary  condition  of  agency,  it  is  also
present beyond its limits. Another is that un-
derstanding beyond the limits of agency cannot
be understood individualistically. This is obvi-
ous in the case of intrinsically social activities,
like conversation, but it is also true for organ-
ized activities that can be carried out by solit-
ary individuals (such as seeing, for example). 
The  thing  that  anti-intellectualism  gets
right, as I see it, is the appreciation that a great
deal  of  what  we  do,  isn’t  really  done  by  us:
activity happens to us; we find ourselves organ-
ized. We are made what we are in the setting of
organized activities. 
From the standpoint of the theory of or-
ganized activities—presented in more detail in
Noë (in press)—we are creatures who are from
the  very  beginning  caught  up  in  world  and
other-involving organized activities; these activ-
ities form the lived substrate of our biographical
lives  as  persons.  Actionism,  in  these  ways,  is
committed to a radical form of anti-individual-
ism.
3 The challenge of crypto-individualism
Now, Kyselo has criticized actionism not for ig-
noring the social, but for failing to treat the so-
cial as constitutive of human cognitive organiza-
tion. Kyselo’s point is that for actionism, other
people and our relations to them “shape” the
mind, but they do so in the same the way that
any environmental conditions cause, constrain,
or enable human experience; the view makes no
allowance for the stronger possibility that other
people and our social  relations with them are
actually constitutive of what it is to be a human
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being. So she writes, with actionism as one of
her targets in mind: 
Philosophers  of  cognition  systematically
assume  that  the  mind  is  essentially  em-
bodied, while the social world remains the
context  in  which  the  embodied  mind  is
embedded. On this view, the social argu-
ably shapes the mind, but it does not fig-
ure in the constitution of the mind itself.
(Kyselo this collection, p. 2)
And she goes on to explain: 
I argue that since the world of humans is a
social world of others and our social rela-
tions is what matters most to us, the so-
cial  must  also  figure  in  the  constitutive
structure  of  human  cognitive  individu-
ation. The human mind or self is not only
embodied but also genuinely social. (ibid.,
p. 2)
In a footnote, she then elaborates: 
By  saying  that  sociality  matters  con-
stitutively for the human self, I mean that
without  continuously  relating  and  enga-
ging  in  interaction  with  others,  there
would be no human self as a whole. The
social is not only causally relevant for en-
acting self-hood, but it is also an essential
component  of  its  minimal  organizational
structure. (ibid., p. 2)
Now, I admit that the language of earlier work
(Noë 2004, 2012) can be taken to suggest some-
thing like crypto-individualism. In so far  as  I
talk about presence as something that thinkers
and perceivers “achieve,” and in so far as I in-
sist  that,  in achieving the world’s presence in
thought  and  experience,  we  also  achieve
ourselves,  it  can perhaps sound like I am de-
scribing the enactive feats of a heroic solitary
agency. 
I admit that’s how it sounds. But I was
careful to warn against being misled in this way.
So, for example, in a passage immediately fol-
lowing one that Kyselo cites, I write:
But we are not only animals. I am also a
father, and a teacher, and a philosopher,
and a writer. These modalities of my being
were no more given to me than my ability
to read and write. I achieve myself. Not on
my own, to be sure! And not in a heroic
way. Maybe it would better to say that my
parents  and  my  friends  and  family  and
children and colleagues have achieved me
for me. The point is that we are cultivated
ourselves—learning to talk and read and
dance and dress  and play guitar and do
mathematics  and physics  and philosophy
—and in this cultivation worlds open up
that would otherwise be closed off. In this
way we achieve for ourselves new ways of
being present.
Here I explicitly repudiate heroic individualism;
we achieve ourselves with and through others;
we are cultivated by a world full of others and
that’s the setting in which we bring the world
into focus for consciousness. 
Perhaps  another  feature  that  feeds  the
appearance  of  crypto-individualism  is  the
availability of an idealist or anti-realist read-
ing of enacting or achieving presence. It is not
in fact my view—Kyselo herself is clear about
this—that we make the world, or construct it.
The world shows up for us, in perception, and
in  thought,  and  for  action.  But  it  doesn’t
show up for free. Just as you can’t encounter
what a text means if you don’t know how to
read, so you can’t see what is there to be seen
without the battery of understandings neces-
sary for reaching out and picking it up.
We  don’t  make  the  world,  just  as  we
don’t  make other  people.  In fact,  the world,
and  others,  are  necessary  for  us  to  achieve
contact  with it  in three distinct  ways.  First,
our  experience  of  others  and  the  world  de-
pends on their existence. If they weren’t there,
we couldn’t  achieve  access  to  them.  Second,
our  possession  and  exercise  of  the  relevant
skills may require the presence and participa-
tion of others. Think of the turn-taking dance
that  is  conversation;  you  can’t  do  that
without  the  other.  Third,  our  possession  of
perceptual  and  cognitive  skills  of  access  de-
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pends  on  our  development  in  the  setting  of
personal relationships.
Does  the  commitment  of  actionism  to
these three kinds of dependence of our experi-
ence on our engagement with others meet the
standard of offering an account of other people
as not merely shaping but as constituting our
mental lives? If not, I hope to be told why.
Let me offer a final example to try to cla-
rify  what  is  at  stake.  Take  a  baseball  team.
There  will  be  nine  players  on  the  field  at  a
given  time  during  a  game:  a  pitcher  and
catcher,  three  basemen,  a  shortstop,  and  the
three outfielders. Notice that there are two dif-
ferent ways in which we can individuate these
players. We can pick them out by the role that
they  play—by their  position,  in  baseball  par-
lance—or we can pick them out by the player,
that is, by the particular person who is playing
the role. Take the shortstop, for example. The
shortstop is the near outfielder, or the far in-
fielder;  he is  positioned between 2nd and 3rd
bases. His job is to field balls hit to him and to
deliver  the  balls  to  teammates  in  ways  that
work to his team’s advantage. For our purposes
it is important to notice that a shortstop is a
social  creature  in  the  sense  that  a)  to  be  a
shortstop is to play a role that can only be spe-
cified  by  naming  other  positions  and  shared
goals and needs, and b) that there is no such
thing as a shortstop outside of the context of
convention,  practice,  and  history—for  that  is
what baseball is: a structure in a temporally ex-
tended  space  of  convention  and  practice.  A
shortstop, we might say, is a thoroughly social
kind of thing. It is constituted by social rela-
tions. 
Notice  that  this  way  of  thinking  about
what it is to be a shortstop takes nothing away
from the fact that shortstops are embodied and
that they are in continuous dynamic exchange
with their physical environment. The quality of
a shortstop is  usually framed in terms of  the
range of ground he can cover, the softness of his
hands, the strength of his arm, the delicacy and
control of his footwork, and finally, his under-
standing of what to do in the split-second heat
of  play.  Physical  and  intellectual  skill  are  all
properties  of  this  essentially  social  being,  the
shortstop. And this is so for all the other play-
ers.
Now,  the  fact  that  being  a  shortstop  is
something  “whose  identity  is  brought  forth
through  body-mediated  social  interaction”,  as
we  could  say,  borrowing  Kyselo’s  words  (this
collection, p. 2),  doesn’t  entail that the flesh-
and-blood  human  being  who  is  playing
shortstop is also in the same way identity-de-
pendent on his or her social relations. The indi-
vidual existence of the man, after all, the actual
guy, the living human organism, is presupposed
by his entering into the kinds of relationships
that  can  make  it  the  case  that  he  is  also  a
shortstop.
This sort of consideration can be general-
ized: just as we can distinguish the player from
the position he plays, so we can distinguish the
human being from the person he or she also is.
Personhood is enacted, achieved, or performed
in ways not so different from the way being a
baseball-player  is  undertaken.  A  person  is
defined  by  nesting  and  overlapping  roles—
daughter, employer, citizen, rebel, lover, failure,
and so on. And these roles are genuinely con-
stitutive of who or what a person is, of his or
her  identity.  Truly  these  constitutive  features
that make a person the person she is  are ro-
bustly and thoroughly social, in all the ways be-
ing a shortstop is social. You can’t be a person
on  your  own,  any  more  than  you  can  be  a
shortstop on your own. Persons are creatures of
normative,  evaluative spaces.  Persons are per-
formers.  They perform their  personhood.  And
they bear the ever-present burden of being eval-
uated.  That,  finally,  is  the difference  between
mere action and performance. Performance, as
distinct from mere action, happens against the
background of  the possibility  of  being judged
(good dancer, good father, good lover, good stu-
dent, etc.).
Personhood  is  enacted.  But  what  about
being human? Is that enacted as well? Is one’s
status as a human being, like one’s status as a
person, or a shortstop, something that is accom-
plished through one’s body-mediated social in-
teractions? 
This much is clear. Being a distinct human
being is antecedent to entering into the kinds of
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relationships that constitute one’s being a per-
son, or a shortstop. So it can’t be that it is the
same kinds of relations with others that consti-
tute one’s personal identity (in my sense) that
constitute one’s organismic identity as a human
being. My question for Kyselo, then, would be:
why should we say that human beings,  above
and beyond the persons they enact, are, in the
relevant sense,  constitutively social? Or better
still, the question is: what is the relevant sense
of “constitutively social”? 
Let me be clear that I think it would be a
mistake  to  hold  that  personhood,  bound  up
with practice, convention, and history, though it
is,  is  merely cultural,  and  that  this  cultural
structure  is  stamped  or  imposed  onto  a  pre-
given  biological  substrate  (the  human  being).
No, each of us is  both a human being and a
person  and  any  comprehension  of  our  nature
needs to do justice to both of these. A biological
theory of  us will be a theory of creatures who
are both persons as well as organisms and will
take  seriously  the  way  these  loop  back  and
down and the way they interact.
4 Conclusion
There is much in Kyselo’s excellent response to
which I have said nothing in reply. I am struck,
in particular, by her powerful handling of the
concept of fragility. I have tried, in this reply, to
show  that  actionism,  despite  appearances  of
heroic individualism to the contrary, recognizes
that people spend their lives in worlds that are
always ineliminably social. 
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